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INTRODUCTION

" .the largest environmental catastrophe in the history of the United States."'
. the largest civil penalty ever paid by any defendant under any environmen2
tal statute, and the largest recovery of damages for injury to natural resources."
" . . . the largest settlement with a single entity in the history of federal law
enforcement."'
4
" . . . the largest criminal resolution in United States history."
Offshore exploration and production of oil and gas in deep water (as opposed to
shallow water drilling near the coastline) is an extremely complex and risky endeavor.
At the most basic level, the goal is the same as onshore drilling: create a secure pathway
through subsurface rock formations to access trapped hydrocarbons and extract them to
the surface. Offshore and onshore drillers also share the challenge of maintaining the
"delicate balance" of competing pressures deep inside the well. If the pressures fall out of
balance and well integrity is lost, there could be an "uncontrolled intrusion of hydrocarbons into the well, and a discharge from the well itself as the oil and gas rush up and out
of the well," also called a "blowout."'
Yet, offshore drilling involves many complexities not found on land.6 For instance,
an offshore drilling unit floats on the surface of the ocean miles- from shore and
thousands of feet above the hole it is drilling on the sea bed below, whereas inland
drilling and production units sit directly on top of the well in physical contact with the
land surrounding the hole. On land, hydrocarbons reach their collection point when
they arrive at the well head, whereas offshore they must then travel thousands of feet up
through a flexible riser that connects the well head to the rig on the surface. All of the
underwater components that make deepwater drilling possible are subject to the intense
pressures of ocean depths and the corrosive effects of seawater. For these reasons, deepwater drilling has been equated to working on the surface of the moon or performing
7
heart surgery at the bottom of the ocean.
If a blowout occurs on land, the uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons will pool on the
ground or flow in accordance with the local topography, and the point of discharge,
usually the well head, can be directly accessed on land by response crews. In an underwa-
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at xiii (2010).
by the United States for Entry of Consent
Motion
Memorandum in Support of Unopposed
Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of
Oil
the
by
Spill
re
Oil
Decree with BP at 2, In
(E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016) [hereinafter
2179
No.
MDL
10-4536,
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No.
Memorandum in Support].
Id.
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bpexploration-and-production-inc-agre es-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-environmental.
Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Deep Water:
The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 91 (2011) [hereinafter Deepwater
Report].
See id. at 51-52 (discussing the special challenges of deepwater drilling generally).
Cavnar, supra note 1, at 33.
BOB CAVNAR,

DISASTER ON THE HORIZON,

2017]

The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

155

ter blowout, or even a surface discharge such as the Exxon Valdez spill, the escaping
hydrocarbons are subject to tidal currents that can spread the oil and gas quickly across
many square miles of ocean and eventually to shorelines, wreaking havoc on underwater
and coastal wildlife and ecosystems along the way. This makes the response and cleanup
exponentially more difficult than an inland spill and underscores the importance of
preventing an underwater blowout in the first place.
On the night of April 20, 2010, about 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana on the
Outer Continental Shelf, the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon was preparing to temporarily abandon the exploratory Macondo well it had been drilling for the BP
Oil Company (BP) (formerly known as British Petroleum Company). At the time, BP
was $60 million over budget and 54 days behind schedule on the Macondo well, and
every additional day the rig stayed on the well cost BP another $1 million.9 BP was also
under immense pressure to get the Deepwater Horizon to perform work on two other wells
so as not to lose the 5,700 acre lease it spent over $30 million to acquire from the United
States two years earlier.1o
Likewise, the Macondo well was under tremendous pressure, though of the geologic
kind. Before the well could be abandoned, the crew of the Deepwater Horizon needed to
perform various tests to ensure there were no leaks and the competing pressures in and
around the well were in balance." One such test, the "negative pressure test,"1 2 was
performed twice, but the results were misinterpreted, thereby preventing the crew from
realizing that well integrity was in jeopardy.1 3 As a result, blowout-prevention measures
(like re-casing the well with new cement, for example) were not taken.' As the crew
then proceeded with the next phase of well abandonment-removing the drilling
mud-the pressurized hydrocarbons that had indeed breached the well casing rushed
upward, pushing the mud out of the well head, past the blowout preventer, and into the
riser that connected the well to the Deepwater Horizon." By the time the crew realized
what was happening to the well, the blowout was well underway.16 Attempts to activate
the blowout preventer failed, and when the oil and gas reached the rig and spewed out
onto the drilling platform, the highly flammable fluids quickly found an ignition source,
causing an explosion.17

8
9
10
11
12

In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010
(In re Oil Spill (Phase 1)), 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 666-67, 671 (E.D. La. 2014).
Id. at 675.
Id. at 671, 675.
Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at 105.
Id. The negative-pressure test "checks not only the integrity of the [well] casing, . . . but
also the integrity of the bottomhole cement job." Id. In a negative-pressure test, "the crew
removes pressure from inside the well to see if fluids, such as hydrocarbons, leak in, past or
through the bottomhole cement job. . . . If the casing and primary cement have been

13
14
15
16
17

designed and installed properly, they will prevent hydrocarbons from intruding even when
[the] pressure is removed." Id.
Id. at 105-09.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id.
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The blast killed eleven of the crew instantly and damaged the riser, the rig, and its
emergency systems so severely that the last lines of defense against an uncontrolled
blowout were rendered ineffective-the rig was dead.18 Surviving crew members abandoned ship and then watched from a nearby vessel as the Deepwater Horizon burned
continuously until it listed and sank below the surface two days later.'9 As it sank, the
riser connecting the rig to the well head buckled and ruptured, allowing the still-pres20
surized flow of hydrocarbons to discharge into the ocean.
For 87 days, the oil discharged freely into the ocean until the well was finally capped
on July 15, 2010.21 Until that time, the largest offshore drilling-related spill into American waters was the 1969 Union Oil Company blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel in
California, where approximately 100,000 barrels of oil were spilled." The Exxon Valdez
accident, the largest ocean-related spill, resulted in the discharge of about 260,000 barrels of oil along the shores of Alaska. 23 The Deepwater Horizon accident dwarfed them
all, causing the release of 3.19 million barrels of oil into the ocean and onto the shores of
all five Gulf Coast states, which in turn caused extensive and unprecedented damage to
coastal ecosystems and economies. 24
Government's response began immediately. The Coast Guard assumed command of
the response pursuant to a National Contingency Plan, setting up Incident Command
Posts in Houma, Louisiana and in Houston, Texas, and deploying resources to begin
fighting the fire and searching for survivors.2 5 BP activated skimmer vessels to begin
collecting oil from the surface and spreading chemical dispersants that break down oil so
that it can dissolve and mix with the water. 26 Eventually, more than 45,000 responders
from the Coast Guard, Louisiana National Guard, and several federal agencies were
27
deployed to begin cleanup operations.
On May 19, 2010, the Secretary of the Interior dismantled the Minerals Management Service (MMS), the federal agency that managed the country's oil, natural gas, and
other resources on the outer continental shelf, and reassigned its jurisdiction and duties
to three other agencies. 28 A few days later, President Obama created the National Com-
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21
22
23
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25
26
27
28

Id. at 114-15.
In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (E.D. La. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at 28.
See NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, http://response.restora
tion.noaa.gov/oil-and-chemical-spills/significant-incidents/exxon-valdez-oil-spill (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010
(In re Oil Spill (Phase 2)), 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 522, 525 (E.D. La. 2015) (finding for the
purposes of the case a release of 3.19 million barrels but suggesting the number could have
been as high as 4.19 million barrels); see Campbell Robertson et al., BP to Pay $18.7 Billion
for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/03/us/bp-to-pay-gulf-coast-states-18-7-billion-for-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill.html.
Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at 130-31.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 133.
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., The Reorganization of the Former MMS, https://
www.boem.gov/reorganization/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). The three agencies that the
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mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling and tasked it with
determining the cause of the explosion and oil spill, figuring out ways to improve oil spill
response, and producing recommendations for safety reforms for offshore drilling.29 In
late May, the Obama administration suspended all deepwater oil and gas drilling (but
not the continued production of existing wells) in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific
Ocean for six months.30 In July, a few days after the well was finally sealed, the President
issued an executive order establishing a National Ocean Council and a national policy
to, among other things, "ensure the protection, maintenance, and restoration of the
health of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems and resources."3 1 Numerous new
laws and regulations followed, dramatically changing the regulatory framework governing offshore exploration while reshaping the liability structure for future spills.32
The lawsuits began almost immediately. Since the explosion, thousands of cases involving hundreds of thousands of named claimants have been filed in federal and state
courts."3 The claims have included wrongful death and personal injury both from the
explosion and the response, as well as damage to property or natural resources, and economic losses.34
On December 15, 2010, the United States government filed a complaint in the
Eastern District of Louisiana against BP for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) 5 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).3 6 Similar lawsuits by the five Gulf
States-Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas-as well as numerous local
governments, soon followed.17 In 2014, the government brought criminal charges against
BP, Transocean, and Anadarko in federal court, alleging fourteen counts of criminal
behavior. 8

Today, the major civil claims against the parties responsible for the Deepwater Horizon accident have been resolved through settlements, and the criminal charges have
been disposed of through plea agreements. The cases in which these claims and charges
were adjudicated, and the resulting settlements, are very complex. This article provides a

30
31
32

ENvTL.

33
34
35
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37
38

L.J. 159, 159-60 (2013).

In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (E.D. La. 2014).
Id.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (CWA).
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (OPA); Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration
Production Inc. ("BPXP"), the United States of America, and the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas at 1, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-4536, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 4,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/file/838066/download [hereinafter Consent Decree].
Id. at 1-4.
In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d at 668.
&

29

MMS was divided into are (1) BOEM, (2) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and (3) the Office of Natural Resources Revenue. Id.
Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at vi. Included amongst the many recommendations the
Commission offered was the need for government oversight and regulation that can keep
pace with the "remarkable technological innovation and productivity" of the oil and gas
industry. Id. at 57.
Id. at 152.
Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (July 19, 2010).
See Amber L. MacIver, Offshore Oil and Gas: Chartering a New Course in 2012, 43 TEX.
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concise review of the major parties involved in the accident, the cases and settlements
that produced the historic penalties and fines, and the major funding streams through
which those penalties and fines are administered.

II.
A.

THE PRIMARY PARTIES TO THE DEEPWATER

THE RESPONSIBLE

HORIZON INCIDENT

PARTIES/DEFENDANTS

BP paid about $34 million to the United States in 2008 for the 5,760-acre lease on
which the Macondo well was drilled.3 9 At the time of the spill, BP co-leased the tract
40
The
with Anadarko, another oil and gas exploration-and-production company.
Anadarko
(65%),
BP
companies:
Macondo well itself was co-owned by three oil and gas
(25%), and MOEX Offshore 2007, LLC (10%).4' Still, BP was the operator and primary
leaseholder of the well.42 Under MMS regulations, this meant BP was "the person the
lessee(s) designates as having control or management of operations on the leased areas or
a portion thereof."43
45
Transocean4 4 owned the Deepwater Horizon rig and employed its crew. BP hired
6
Transocean "to implement BP's drilling plan for the Macondo well."' Under this arrangement, BP acted as supervisor, "determin[ing] and direct[ing] all aspects of how the
well would be drilled, . . . the cementing process, and how and when temporary abandonment would take place."*4
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. provided cementing services and mudlogging services for BP on the Macondo well.48 While Halliburton made recommendations to BP
on the design and execution of the Macondo well's cementing operations, it was ulti-

39
40
41
42

Id.; see also Deepwater Report, supra note 5, at 89 (stating the price for the lease).
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010,
844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 747 (E.D. La. 2012), rev'd in part, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. La. 2014).
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010
(In re Oil Spill (Anadarko Penalties)), 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 567 (E.D. La. 2015).
In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d at 671. Multiple wholly-owned subsidiaries of BP
P.L.C. were involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, including BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company. See id. at 668-69 (listing the "BP
Entities" defendants in the Phase 1 civil trial). For simplicity, this article will refer to BP
entities collectively as "BP."

43

Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. § 250.105 as it existed on April 20, 2010).

44

Id. As with BP, many subsidiaries of Transocean played a role in the accident. See id. at 669
(listing the "Transocean Entities" defendants of the Phase 1 civil trial). For simplicity, this
article will refer to all Transocean entities collectively as "Transocean."

45

Id.

46

Information for Clean Water Act Violation at 2, United States v. Transocean Deepwater

Inc., No. 2:13-cr-00001-JTM-SS (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/de
fault/files/criminal-vns/legacy/2013/01/18/2013-01-03-transocean-information.pdf.

47
48

In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d at 746.
Id. at 669.
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mately BP that decided whether the design was appropriate and should be used.4 9 It
then Halliburton's responsibility to test the cement. 50
Several other entities involved in the drilling of the Macondo well were either
parties to the civil and criminal proceedings or were subsequently removed. This
cluded the manufacturer of the well's blowout preventer, the provider of goods and
vices related to drilling fluids, and several subsea oilfield services companies."

B.

159
was
not
inser-

THE PLAINTIFFS

The United States, represented by the Department of Justice, brought criminal
charges against BP and Transocean.5 2 It also sued BP, Transocean, Anadarko, MOEX,
and several smaller companies for civil penalties under the CWA and OPA.5 3
The five Gulf States-Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida-all
brought actions under their respective state environmental laws seeking civil penalties
against BP and other responsible parties. 4 Each of these cases was transferred to and
consolidated as multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Louisiana." Texas
brought its claims under the state's Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act and the
Texas Water Code, in addition to claims under the OPA and the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).56 Specifically,
Texas sought cost recovery and damages for injury to natural resources, lost tax and state
park revenues, and other economic damages.
Lastly, a multitude of private individuals, businesses, and other entities across the
Gulf filed claims against BP, Transocean and others, which claims also became part of
the multidistrict litigation in the Louisiana federal court. 7

III.

ADJUDICATION OF THE MAJOR CIVIL CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE
DEEPWATER

HORIZON INCIDENT

To date, thousands of complaints have been filed in federal and state courts around
the nation as a result of the spill.18 Most of the federal cases were transferred to the
Eastern District of Louisiana as multidistrict litigation.5 9That court "adopted a phased

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id.
In re Oil Spill (Anadarko Penalties), 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 566 (E.D. La. 2015).
Consent Decree, supra note 36, at 1-4 (describing in detail each of the states' claims).
Id.
Id. at 2-3; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (2012) (CERCLA); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 40.001-008 (West 2015) (Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act); TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.003 (West 2015) (relating to water quality control).

57
58
59

In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp.3d at 669.
See, e.g., id.
Id. at 667. Where multiple federal civil actions in different federal districts share common
questions of fact, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has authority
to transfer such cases to any one district and court "for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
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trial proceeding that ultimately focused on two cases" that would be handled as one
bench trial.60
The first case, Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, et al., was a limitation of liability action
under U.S. maritime law.61 In that case, Transocean, as owner of the Deepwater Horizon
vessel, sought to exercise its statutory right to limit its liability in a maritime claim-in
this case for personal injury and/or death of its employees from the explosion of the
62
vessel-to the value of the vessel and its pending freight. In the second case, United
States v. BP Exploration & Production Inc., et al., the United States sought two forms of
relief against BP, Transocean, Anadarko, MOEX, and others: civil penalties under the
6
CWA and a declaratory judgment of liability under the OPA. 3
These two cases were consolidated and styled as In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010. The fact-finding proceedings were
separated into three phases. Phase 1, or the "Incident Phase," involved the determination and allocation of fault for every stage of the accident, from the initial loss of well
integrity to the mishandling of the negative pressure test, the failure of the blowout
preventer, the explosion and sinking of the rig and, finally, the breach of the riser and
discharge of oil.64 Phase 1 also included a determination of whether any defendant engaged in misconduct beyond simple negligence, a crucial inquiry that would determine
the maximum allowable penalty.65
Phase 2 of In re Oil Spill concerned the aftermath of the explosion and spill, examining (1) "Source Control," or the defendants' conduct or omissions in stopping the release
of oil, and (2) "Quantification," or the amount (in barrels) of oil actually released from
the well.66 The Quantification segment together with the negligence determination in
6
Phase 1 would determine the total amount of civil penalties levied under the CWA. 7
Phase 3 was the "Penalty Phase," in which the Court would consider evidence from
6
the parties regarding factors that could mitigate or exacerbate the penalty amount. 8

60
61
62

63
64
65
66
67
68

proceedings" if doing so "will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). In this
case, all of the cases were consolidated into MDL No. 2179. A complete listing of all orders
entered in MDL No. 2179 can be viewed online on the website for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, accessible at http://www.
laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/OilSpill.htm.
In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d at 667.
Id. at 668; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a) (2012) (providing for a general limit of liability
under the Limitation of Liability Act).
In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F.-Supp. 3d at 668. The Court ultimately held that Transocean
was not entitled to limit its liability because "the negligence or unseaworthiness that caused
the damage was within the 'privity or knowledge' of the owner." Id. at 753 (quoting 46
U.S.C. § 30505).
Id.
Id. at 668, 730.
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id. at 668.
See, e.g., In re Oil Spill (Anadarko Penalties), 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 565 (E.D. La. 2015).
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A. PHASE 1

OF IN RE OIL SPILL -

161

THE "INCIDENT PHASE"

No party to the Phase 1 trial disputed that a "harmful" amount of oil was released
from the Macondo well in violation of section 311 of the CWA. 69 When section
311(b)(3) is violated, section 311(b)(7)(A) imposes a civil penalty upon "the owner,
operator, or person in charge of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from
which" the discharge occurred.70 As an initial matter of law via cross-motions for partial
summary judgment, the court had to decide whether the discharge of oil emanated from
the "vessel" owned by Transocean (the Deepwater Horizon and riser connecting it to the
well) or the "offshore facility" owned by BP and Anadarko (the Macondo well). The
answer to that question determined liability for CWA penalties.
Anadarko argued that the oil had entered the marine environment from the riser
owned by Transocean, and thus not from any facility owned or operated by BP or
Anadarko.71 Transocean meanwhile argued that the term "from" refers to the source of
the discharge, in this case the Macondo well, "where the uncontrolled movement of oil
began, not some conduit through which oil momentarily passed."72 The court agreed
with Transocean, concluding that the Macondo well was an "offshore facility" under the
CWA "from which oil discharged."n As such, BP was an "operator" and a "person in
charge" of the offshore facility from which the discharge occurred and was therefore
liable for penalties under the CWA, section 311(b)(7)(A), "even if it is later determined
that the discharge was 'from' the vessel and not the offshore facility."74
That left the court to decide in Phase 1 whether the discharge was the result of gross
negligence or willful misconduct.71 This determination was pivotal. If the court found
gross negligence or willful misconduct the CWA's maximum penalty of $1,000 per barrel
for a simply negligent discharge could rise to $4,300 per barrel.76

69

70
71

72
73

74
75
76

In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d at 731 n. 160. Section 311(b)(3), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b)(3), prohibits the discharge of "harmful" quantities of oil into the navigable waters of the United States and adjoining shorelines, or in connection with federally authorized deepwater exploration activities. See id. A "harmful" discharge includes one that
"[c]ause[s] a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining
shorelines or cause[s] a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of the water
or upon adjoining shorelines." Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 110.3(b) (2014)).
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (2012).
See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20,
2010, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 757 (E.D. La. Feb. 2012) (ruling on cross motions for partial
summary judgment regarding liability under the CWA and OPA), rev'd in part, 21 F. Supp.
3d 657 (E.D. La. 2014).
Id.
See id. at 761. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and BP and Anadarko filed petitions for rehearing that were pending at the time the Phase 1 trial concluded. See United States v. B.P.
Expl. & Prod. Inc. (In re Deepwater Horizon), 753 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2014).
In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d at 746.
Id. at 732 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. The CWA provisions establishing maximum penalty amounts have corresponding federal regulations that increase those amounts to account for inflation. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
§ 19.4 (2017). So, under the CWA, the maximum penalty for a negligent discharge is
$1,000 per barrel, which was increased to $1,100 per barrel by the regulation. Compare 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (statutory maximum) with 40 C.F.R. § 19.4; 33 C.F.R. § 27.3 (fed-
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Presented with a mountain of detailed evidence at trial on the various and interconnected causes of the spill, the court analyzed whether BP's conduct in the incident was
"an extreme departure from the care required under the circumstances or a failure to
exercise even slight care" (gross negligence and recklessness), or whether it acted intentionally with the knowledge that its conduct would "probably result in injury" or "in
such a way as to allow an inference of a reckless disregard of the probable consequences"
(willful misconduct).7 7 Starting from the recognition of the inherent danger and risk
involved with deepwater drilling, the court found that BP committed one act of gross
negligence and willful misconduct when it misinterpreted the negative pressure test of
the well.78 The court also determined that BP had committed a series of merely negligent
acts involving technical drilling decisions that, taken together, "evince an extreme
deviation from the standard of care and a conscious disregard of known risks" that rose to
the level of gross negligence.79 In the end, the court concluded the Deepwater Horizon oil
0
spill was the result of BP's gross negligence and willful misconduct under the CWA.8
Next, the court set about allocating the degree of fault under general maritime law to
BP, Transocean, and Halliburton, each of which had "engaged in conduct that was negligent or worse and a legal cause of the blowout, explosion, and oil spill.""' Finding that
BP's conduct was reckless, and that Transocean and Halliburton acted negligently, the
court then concluded that the parties' comparative fault, expressed as a percentage of
total liability, was as follows: BP - 67%; Transocean - 30%; and Halliburton - 3%.82
The court noted that Transocean's and Halliburton's respective shares of liability were
83
significantly less than BP's because "BP had a hand in most of [their] failures." The
court even went so far as to say that the conduct of BP's employees was "egregious
enough that exemplary or punitive damages would be appropriate," but declined to im8
pose them, citing Fifth Circuit precedent. Notably, the court declined to extend BP's
and Transocean's respective maritime liability to the parent corporations of those two
companies, thereby isolating the impact of the two companies' liability to their North
American concerns.
Lastly, the court addressed the OPA claim. The OPA imposes strict liability on
"responsible parties" for removal costs and damages resulting from the discharge of oil.86

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

eral regulations). Likewise, the statutory maximum penalty for a discharge resulting from
gross negligence or willful misconduct is $3,000 per barrel, which federal regulations raised
to $4,000 or $4,300 per barrel. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D) (statutory maximum
for gross negligence or willful misconduct) with 40 C.F.R. § 19.4; 33 C.F.R. § 27.3 (increasing the maximum penalty to $4,000 and $4,300, respectively).
In re Oil Spill (Phase 1), 21 F. Supp. 3d at 732-33.
Id. at 738-42.
Id. at 742-43.
Id. at 732, 737.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 751.
33 U.S.C. § 2701(32) (2012) (defining "responsible parties" to include the owner or operator of a vessel, or the lessee or permittee of an area where an offshore facility is located); id.
§ 2702(a) (imposing strict liability).
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Under the OPA's liability scheme, if the drilling rig is being used as an "offshore facility"
(i.e., it is being used for exploration, drilling, and producing as opposed to being in
transit from one well to another), and the discharge occurs beneath the surface of the
ocean, then the "responsible party" is the lessee of the area being drilled.87 In its previous
ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the court had held that the Deepwater Horizon was being used as an "offshore facility" at the time of the discharge and
therefore BP and Anadarko were the "responsible parties" for the subsurface discharge,
not Transocean.8 After trial, however, the court concluded that Transocean was liable
for removal costs under a different OPA provision that makes the "owner or operator" of
an "Outer Continental Shelf facility" liable to the government for all removal costs
associated with the discharge of oil from the facility.89
B.

PHASE

2

OF

IN

RE OIL SPILL -

"SOURCE CONTROL" AND

"QUANTIFICATION"
1.

SOURCE

CONTROL

' The Phase 2 trial commenced five months after the Phase 1 trial, but a year before
the court issued its findings and conclusions from Phase 1.90 It began with an examination of the response to the oil spill in the days, weeks, and months after the Macondo
blowout and spill, referred to as the "Source Control" segment of the Phase 2 trial.91 On
one side, a group of "Aligned Parties"-private plaintiffs, the States of Alabama and
Louisiana, Transocean, and Halliburton-claimed that: (1) BP's response to the spill
and its efforts to stop the discharge of oil were flawed to a degree that would warrant
punitive damages; and (2) BP's source control conduct made it a superseding cause of the
spill, thereby exculpating Transocean and Halliburton from the liability they were
deemed to have under Phase 1.92
BP disputed these claims with evidence that its source control plan complied with
federal regulations and industry practice.9 3 The court sided with BP, concluding that its
post-blowout decisions and actions were not grossly negligent, and that punitive damages
were not warranted.94 The court reiterated, however, that these holdings would not affect any of the court's findings and conclusions from the Phase 1 trial.95
2.

QUANTIFICATION

In the Phase 1 trial, the court found that the discharge of oil in the Deepwater Horizon incident resulted from BP's gross negligence and willful misconduct, a holding that

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010,
844. F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 (E.D. La. 2012), rev'd in part, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. La. 2014).
Id. at 755-56.
Id. at 755; 33 U.S.C. § 2 702 (c)(3).
In re Oil Spill (Phase 2), 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 503-04 (E.D. La. 2015) (presenting a timeline
of the case).
Id. at 503.
Id. at 504, 516.
See id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 525.
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set the maximum civil penalty under the CWA at up to $4,300 per barrel discharged.96
That left the court to determine in the "Quantification" segment of the Phase 2 trial the
total number of barrels that were discharged into the ocean from the Macondo well in
order to set the total CWA penalty amount.
The net amount discharged would be determined by taking the number of barrels
estimated to have left the underground reservoir and then subtracting the amount of oil
collected during the spill response that had not "contact[ed] any ambient seawater" (i.e.,
that had not actually polluted the environment).97 As the Court somewhat grumbled,
"[t]here is no way to know with precision how much oil discharged into the Gulf of
Mexico," as "[tihere was no meter counting off each barrel of oil as it exited the well."98
This unfortunate reality begot troves of expert testimony that was "dense, highly technical, and conflicting."9 9
The parties to the Quantification segment of the Phase 2 trial, plaintiff United
States and defendants BP and Anadarko,10 agreed that 810,000 barrels of oil were collected during the spill before reaching the breach in the riser and spilling out into open
water.10 1 But they disputed the amount of oil that left the reservoir. The United States
claimed that five million barrels escaped the reservoir, which after subtracting the collected oil would result in a net discharge of 4.19 million barrels, thereby implying a
maximum CWA penalty of just over $18 billion.102 BP and Anadarko, on the other
hand, argued that 3.26 million barrels had escaped, leading to a 2.45-million net dis03
charge (implying a $10.5-billion CWA penalty).1
The Court found that four million barrels had left the reservoir, resulting in a net
discharge of 3.19 million barrels.104 Thus, after the Phase 1 and Phase 2 trials, BP faced
just over a $13.7-billion penalty for its role in the Deepwater Horizon tragedy.

IV.

DISPOSITION OF THE MAJOR CIVIL CLAIMS

A. BP'S CIVIL SETTLEMENT
In October 2015, while BP's appeal of the Phase 1 holding was pending, the parties
proposed a global Consent Decree that, upon court approval, would settle all civil claims
brought by the United States and the five Gulf States against BP for the Deepwater
Horizon spill. 1o Among other things, the joint filing laid out payment terms for both the

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

See supra note 76.
In re Oil Spill (Phase 2), 77 F. Supp. 3d at 522.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Press Release, Env't & Nat. Res. Div., U.S. Office of the Attorney Gen., U.S. & Five Gulf
States Reach Historic Settlement with BP to Resolve Civil Lawsuit Over Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ us-and-five-gulf-states-reachhistoric-settlement-bp-resolve-civil-lawsuit-over-deepwater.
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civil penalties and natural resource damages, while also specifying injunctive relief and
other terms of compliance.106 The court signed and entered the Consent Decree on
April 4, 2016, thereby certifying the historic settlement.107
The first sum BP agreed to pay in the Decree was a $5.5-billion civil penalty under
the CWA, to be paid in fifteen annual installments from 2017 to 2031.108 Twenty percent of that amount will go into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, an existing fund
managed by the U.S. Coast Guard that is used to address subsequent spills or environmental events related to oil discharges.109 The remaining eighty percent ($4.4 billion)
will be deposited into a special fund in the federal Treasury that was established under
the Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of 2012 (the RESTORE Act), to be used for ecosystem
restoration and economic devel6pment projects along the coast in accordance with the
provisions of the Act.' 10 The payments are made each year on April 4, the anniversary of
the date the Consent Decree was entered.1
Next, BP agreed to pay up to $8.8 billion in natural resources damages (NRD) that
will be used to return natural resources injured or lost as result of the spill to their prespill conditions.12 This amount includes $1 billion BP had already committed to the
federal government and the Gulf States soon after the spill for early restoration
projects."' The Consent Decree required full payment within thirty days from the effec106
107

108
109

110

111
112

See Consent Decree, supra note 36, at 1829 (payment terms), 29-31 (Acceleration of Payments and Financial Assurance), 32-37 (Injunctive Relief), 37-42 (Stipulated Penalties).
Id. at 61. In reviewing any proposed consent decree, a court is to ascertain whether the
decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir.
1977), and consistent with the objectives of the statute under which the action was
brought. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rubin, J.,
concurring) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Consent Decree, supra note 36, at 18-19.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE WITH BP FOR THE
DEEPWATER HORIZON/MACONDO WELL OIL SPILL, https://www.justice. gov/enrd/file/
7803 11/download (explaining that eighty percent of the $5.5-billion civil penalty was allocated under the RESTORE Act while that the remaining civil penalty would be paid to the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund); 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2012) (creating the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund).
See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
H 1602(a)-(b), 126 Stat. 405, 588 (2012) (codified as an amendment to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321) [hereinafter RESTORE Act] (establishing the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund).
The RESTORE Act is a law Congress enacted specifically to administer certain civil and
administrative penalties from the Deepwater Horizon spill. It was codified as an amendment
to 33 U.S.C. § 1321. For a more detailed discussion of the RESTORE Act, see infra Section
VI(d).
See Consent Decree, supra note 36, at 19.
Id. at 20-23. The number of $8.8 billion was reached by adding the $7.1 billion BP agreed
to pay, the $1 billion BP already committed to paying under a previous agreement, and the
$700 million (maximum) BP agreed to pay for unknown damages. "Natural Resource Dam-

113

ages" is defined in the Consent Decree on page 15 and is more fully discussed infra at
Section IV.C.
See id. at 20; see also NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Early Restoration, GULF
SPILL RESTORATION, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa. gov/restoration/early-restoration/
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tive date of the Consent Decree of all outstanding balances remaining from that $1
billion commitment for early restoration projects.1 14 When the Decree was entered, the
NRD process of extensively and scientifically determining the extent of environmental
damage process was still years away from completion.1 '5
The remaining $7.1 billion will be paid, like the CWA penalty, according to a fifteen-year schedule beginning in 2017.116 The natural resource damage payments are deposited into the "Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill NRD Fund," managed by the Department
of the Interior "for the joint benefit and use of the Trustees in accordance with the
requirements" set forth in the Decree.' 17 In addition, BP agreed to pay up to $700 million for damages to natural resources caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill that were
unknown to the Trustees as of July 2, 2015, and for the adaptive management of any
projects selected by the Trustees.1 1 8
In contrast to the CWA penalties, which are governed by the RESTORE Act, the
NRD penalties must be spent in accordance with the provisions of the Decree itself.
Specifically, the Decree states that the NRD penalty amounts must be used: (1) to "address injuries and/or losses to Natural Resources [defined in the Decree] resulting from
the Deepwater Horizon Incident"; (2) for restoration of lost natural resources "as provided
in one or more restoration plans adopted by the Trustees consistent with 15 C.F.R. Part
990"; (3) for monitoring, education, and other administrative activities related to the
restoration plans; and (4) "for addressing unknown conditions and undertaking adaptive
management.""19
Lastly, BP agreed to an additional $600 million in payments attributable to assessment and removal costs under the OPA and penalties under the False Claims Act that
includes amounts for royalties on the oil that was wasted in the spill. zo In all, BP and
the other parties to the Decree paid just under $15 billion to federal and state govern-

(last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (explaining how the $1 billion in early restoration funding has
been used to date).

114

See Consent Decree, supra note 36, at 22; see generally NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., Early Restoration Projects Atlas, GULF SPILL RESTORATION, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/restoration/early-restoration/early-restoration-projects-atlas

(last visited

Apr. 2, 2017).
115
116
117

See Memorandum in Support, supra note 2, at 11-12.
Consent Decree, supra note 36, at 21.
Id. at 22. The term "Trustees" is defined in the Decree to include any federal, state, or local
officials designated by the President or a Gulf State Governor, or authorized under any
applicable law, "to act as trustees on behalf of the public for Natural Resources in connection with the Deepwater Horizon incident." Id. at 13-14, 17-18. In Texas, the Trustees
include officials from the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the Texas General Land
Office, and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. Id. at 18. The Decree describes the uses for which NRD funds should be applied, with reference to federal law that
governs the NRD process. Id. at 22. The NRD process is more fully described infra at Section IV.C.

118 Id. at 23.
119 Id. at 22-24.
120 Id. at 24-27.
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ments. 1 2 1 But that amount does not represent the total amount of funds involved in the
Decree settlement because the court's approval of the Decree was conditioned on the
execution of a separate settlement agreement between BP and the Gulf States and local
governments for economic damages and other claims arising from the spill.122 That set-

tlement involved $4.9 billion in total economic damages to the Gulf States and $1 billion to local governments.123 Taking those amounts into account, the Decree thus
secured over $20 billion in penalties from BP, thus making it "the largest settlement with
a single entity in the history of federal law enforcement."124

B.

TRANSOCEAN AND

MOEX

CIVIL SETTLEMENTS

Before the third phase (the Penalty Phase) trial began, the United States settled its
CWA claims with Transocean and MOEX through consent decrees.125 Transocean
agreed to pay a $1-billion civil penalty.126 Eighty percent of that penalty was dedicated
to environmental and economic restoration activities along the Gulf Coast through the
RESTORE Act, discussed below.127 Transocean also agreed to subject itself to significant
oversight of its drilling operations and to improve the safety of its operations as well as
oil spill preparedness and response practices. 1 28
MOEX agreed to pay $70 million in civil penalties as follows: $45 million to the
United States; $6.75 million to Louisiana; $5 million each to Alabama, Florida, and
Mississippi; and $3.25 million to Texas. 12 9 Those amounts shall be used to acquire Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) properties in the coastal areas of Louisiana,
Texas, Mississippi, and Florida that can be encumbered into perpetuity to protect habitats and natural resources. 13 0

121

122
123
124
125
126

127
128
129

130

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL AND STATE ACTION ON THE TRAGEDY AT THE Deepwater
Horizon/Macondo Well 1, 1-2, https://www.justice.gov/enrd/ file/780461/download (last
visited Apr. 2, 2017) (The payment sums are broken down neatly in a document prepared
by the Department of Justice and accessible on its website.).
Consent Decree, supra note 36, at 1, 51.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 121, at 2.
Memorandum in Support, supra note 2, at 2.
In re Oil Spill (Anadarko Penalties), 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 567 (E.D. La. 2015).
Partial Consent Decree Between the Plaintiff United States of America and Defendants
Triton Asset Leasing GMBH, Transocean Holdings LLC, Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling Inc., and Transocean Deepwater Inc. at 9, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater
Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-4536, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La.
Jan. 13, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/915201313122945254063.pdf
[hereinafter Transocean Consent Decree].
See discussion on the RESTORE Act infra Section VI.D.
Transocean Consent Decree, supra note 126, at 11-34.
Consent Decree Between the United States and MOEX Offshore 2007 LLC at 10, In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 104536, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. June 18, 2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
documents/moex-cd_0.pdf [hereinafter MOEX Consent Decree].
Id. at 12-13.
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ANADARKO'S CIVIL PENALTY

After the court approved the BP, Transocean, and MOEX settlements, "only the
CWA claim against Anadarko remain[ed] at issue.""' The court had previously held
that Anadarko was liable for CWA penalties because it was the part "owner" of an
"offshore facility" (the Macondo well) from which a harmful quantity of oil had discharged.1 3 2 However, unlike BP, Anadarko had not been found negligent as a matter of
law in connection with the blowout, explosion, or oil spill.13 Thus, the maximum penalty that could be assessed against Anadarko was the unenhanced $1,100 per barrel
spilled, or $3.5 billion. 31 Nevertheless, citing Anadarko's lack of culpability and the fact
that the company had already paid a $4 billion settlement of compensatory claims, the
court found Anadarko liable to the United States for CWA penalties in the amount of
$50 per barrel spilled, for in a total penalty of $159.5 million.135

V.

CRIMINAL CHARGEs AGAINST

BP

AND TRANSOCEAN

On November 15, 2012, the United States charged BP with fourteen counts of criminal behavior: eleven counts of seaman's manslaughter, one count of violating the
CWA, one count of violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and one count of obstruction of Congress.1 1 6 Less than two months later the Government charged Transocean
with one count of violating the CWA. 13 7 Both BP and Transocean disposed of their
respective criminal charges through similar. plea agreements with the United States.138

131

In re Oil Spill (Anadarko Penalties), 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 567 (E.D. La. 2015).

132

Id. (quoting In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on

133
134
135

Apr. 20, 2010, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 761 (E.D. La. 2012)).
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 583.

136

Information for Seaman's Manslaughter, Clean Water Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and
Obstruction of Congress at 18-24, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 2:12-

cr-00292-SSV-DEK (E.D. La Nov. 15, 2012). The CWA charge was based on the allegation that BP negligently discharged and caused to be discharged oil that harmfully affected
natural resources of the United States, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)(A) and
132 1(b)(3). Id. at 23. The allegation of a Migratory Bird Treaty Act violation was based on
the deaths-caused by the spill-of multiple migratory birds of protected species. Id. at 24.
The obstruction of Congress charge was based on BP's alleged efforts to "influence, obstruct,
and impede the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which an inquiry and
investigation was being had by" the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of
the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Id.

137

Information for Clean Water Act Violation at 2-3, United States v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc., No. 2.13-cr-00001-JTM-SS (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
The
default/files/criminal-vns/legacy/2013/01/18/2013-01-03-transocean-information.pdf.
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United States, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)(A) and 1321(b)(3). Id.
138

BP's plea agreement was accepted on January 29, 2013. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, United States
v. BP Exploration and Production, Inc. Court Docket Number: 2:12-cr-00292-SSV-DEK,
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BP pleaded guilty to all counts and agreed to pay $4 billion in fines and penalties.' 9 Of
that total, $1.256 billion are statutory criminal fines corresponding to each charge, including a $1.15 billion fine for the CWA that is paid to the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund, discussed above.14o The remainder are criminal penalties dedicated to certain entities for environmental purposes-$350 million to the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) for oil spill prevention and response in the Gulf, and $2.394 billion in staggered
payments over five years to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) to address the spill's harmful impact on coastal natural resources.14 1 For its lone CWA charge,
Transocean pleaded guilty and agreed to pay $400 million in fines and penalties.14 2 Of
that total, NAS and NFWF each received $150 million.14"
All told, the United States' criminal cases against BP and Transocean for the Deepwater Horizon incident secured $1.356 billion in fines for the federal government and just
over $3 billion in penalties for NAS and NFWF and their respective oil-spill-related
environmental purposes. In addition, the plea agreements established specific parameters
on how and for what the $2.544 billion dedicated to NFWF can be spent, discussed in
more detail below.

VI.

THE MAJOR FUNDING STREAMS THAT ADMINISTER THE CIVIL AND

CRIMINAL PENALTIES FROM THE DEEPWATER

A.

SUMMARY OF TOTAL FUNDS AND

AMOUNTS

HORIZON

INCIDENT.

ALLOCATED TO TEXAS

The civil penalties and criminal fines resulting from the settlements and plea agreements described above will be administered through three main funding streams: the
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA), the RESTORE Act, and the National
Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) (criminal penalties). Table 1 breaks down the
total amounts that will be administered through each funding stream. This includes

Pending Crim. Division Cases (June 12, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-vns/case/
bpexploration; see also Guilty Plea Agreement, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod.,
Inc., No. 2:12-cr-00292-SSV-DEK (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/criminal-vns/legacy/2012/12/17/2012-11-15-BP-Guilty-Plea-Agreement.pdf.
Transocean filed its Cooperation Guilty Plea Agreement on January 3, 2013. See Cooperation Guilty Plea Agreement, United States v. Transocean Deepwater Inc., No. 2:13-cr00001-JTM-SS (E.D. La. 2013).
139 Guilty Plea Agreement at 1-4, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 2 :12-cr00292-SSV-DEK (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crimin
al-vns/legacy/2012/12/17/2012-11-15-BP-Guilty-Plea-Agreement.pdf.
140 Id. at 4-5.
141 Order at 16-17, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 2:12-cr-00292-SSVDEK (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-vns/legacy/
2013/02/05/2013-01-29-bp-exploration-order.pdf [hereinafter BP Order].
142 Cooperation Guilty Plea Agreement at 1-4, United States v. Transocean Deepwater Inc.,
No. 2:13-cr-00001-JTM-SS (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-vns/legacy/2013/01/18/ 2013-01-03-transocean-plea-agreement.pdf.
143 Order at 1-2, United States v. Transocean Deepwater Inc., No. 2:13-cr-00001-JTM-SS
(E.D. La. 2013) [hereinafter Transocean Order].
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amounts that are allocated to the Gulf Coast states (see Table 2) as well as amounts
allocated for federal programs. The economic damages settlement that was tied to BP's
global Consent Decree are not administered through any of the three funding streams, so
those amounts are not included here.

TABLE

1

Funding Stream

Total Money Allotted

NRDA

Up to $8.8 billion

RESTORE

$5.33 billion

NFWF

$2.544 billion

Total

$16.67 billion

Table 2 breaks down the totals depicted in Table
Coast states under each funding stream. Note that
funds that have already been allocated to each state;
tional $1.4 billion that has yet to be allocated in each
by the federal RESTORE Council in future rounds of
below.

TABLE

2

(DOLLARS, "M" = MILLION,

44

NRDA'
RESTORE1 4 5
NFWl46

Total

B.

AL
296M
752M
356M
1.4B

FL
680M
723M
356M
1.76B

LA
5B

1B
1.27B
7.27B

1 as they are allocated to the Gulf
the RESTORE Act totals reflect
the totals do not include an addistate in amounts to be determined
funding under Bucket 2, described

MS
296M
728M
356M
1.38B

"B" =

BILLION):

TX
238M
547M
203M
988.5M

U.S.
2.31
1.5B
N/A
3.82B

Total
8.8B
5.3B
2.54B
16.67B

FOUNDATION (NFWF)
The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation is a congressionally-created nonprofit
NATIONAL FISH AND WILDLIFE

organization whose mission is to "further the conservation and management of the fish,
wildlife, and plant resources of the United States .. . for present and future generations
of Americans." 147 NFWF accomplishes its mission by fostering collaboration in the con-

144

145

146

147

Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Plan for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Natural Resource Injury Restoration: An Overview 38, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/wpcontent/uploads/Overview_04-07-16_final-508.pdf.
See discussion of RESTORE Act infra Section VI.D. RESTORE Act totals do not include
$1.4 billion that has yet to be allocated to each Gulf Coast state in amounts to be determined by the federal RESTORE Council in subsequent rounds of funding under Bucket 2.
Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found., Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund, http://www.nfwf.org/gulf/
Pages/home.aspx#.U-vYGm-1EE (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).

16 U.S.C. § 3701(b)(2) (2000). The entirety of the act creating NFWF is codified under 16
U.S.C. H§ 3701-3710.
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servation community and awarding grants.148 Because NFWF's sole purpose is ecosystem
restoration, all of the money given to NFWF as part of the criminal penalties must be
used exclusively for ecosystem restoration. As discussed above, the criminal penalties
associated with the Macondo spill were established by two plea agreements-one with
BP and one with Transocean-approved by a U.S. District Court in 2013.149 In total,
the two companies agreed to pay $2.544 billion (BP: $2.394 billion, Transocean: $150
50
million) in staggered payments to NFWF.o
This money is administered through a specially-created fund managed by NFWF called the Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund
(GEBF).' 5 ' In the first four years, the GEBF has funded 99 projects worth over $870
million.

52

NFWF expenditures of GEBF funds are governed by the criminal plea agreements. 5 3
Half of the penalties ($1.272 billion) are to be divided up amongst the states of Alabama
(28%), Mississippi (28%), Florida (28%), and Texas (16%) to mitigate the spill's damage to natural resources in each state.15 4 The other half goes to Louisiana, where the
majority of the oil washed up, "to create or restore barrier islands off the coast of Louisiana and/or to implement river diversion projects on the Mississippi and/or Atchafalaya
Rivers."' In either case, the court directs NFWF to consult with state and federal resource managers that have statutory authority to coordinate with private entities on
coastal environmental projects.1 5 6 While NFXF consults with other agencies for input
on potential projects, the NFWF Board of Directors makes the ultimate funding
decisions.
In Texas, three natural resource agencies-the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the General Land Office, and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality-sometimes referred to as the "trustee agencies," collaborate with NFWF to
determine which projects to submit to the NFWF board for funding.157 So far, Texas has
been awarded $82 million of its allotted $203 million for 29 projects within the state,
ranging from conservation through land acquisition to restoration of marshes, estuaries,
and wildlife habitats.15
By comparison, NFWF funding in Louisiana is more focused on restoration of barrier
islands and the channels of the Mississippi and Atchafalaya rivers, leading to larger infrastructure projects rather than the smaller ecosystem restoration projects in the other
Gulf States. Therefore, Louisiana has only funded 12 projects to date, worth a total of
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See generally Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found., http://www.nfwf.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
See generally BP Order, supra note 141; Transocean Order, supra note 143.
BP Order, supra note 141, at 16; Transocean Order, supra note 143, at 1.
Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found, supra note 146.
Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found., Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund Projects, http://
www.nfwf.org/gulf/pages/gulf-projects.aspx (listing the funded projects in each gulf state)
(last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
See BP Order, supra note 141, at 17; Transocean Order, supra note 143, at 2.
BP Order, supra note 141, at 17; Transocean Order, supra note 143, at 2.
BP Order, supra note 141, at 18; Transocean Order, supra note 143, at 2.
BP Order, supra note 141, at 17-18; Transocean Order, supra note 143, at 2-3.
Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found., Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund in Texas, http://
www.nfwf.org/ gulf/Pages/GEBF-Texas.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
Id.
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$456 million.19 Many of these projects are large, multi-phase infrastructure projects that
over time will restore major portions of the Louisiana coast and protect inland areas
against future storm surges. 160
Once all $2.544 billion dollars has been deposited in the GEBF by 2018, NFWF will
continue to work on projects on a yearly basis with all Gulf Coast states until their
funding allocations are fully expended.1 61

C.

NATURAL RESOURCE

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

(NRDA)

The second major funding stream through which collected penalties from the Deepwater Horizon incident will be disbursed is the NRDA process. In general, the NRDA
process is a legal process that federal agencies "use to evaluate the impacts of oil spills,
hazardous waste sites, and ship groundings on natural resources both along the nation's
coast and throughout its interior."l 62 The basic goal of the NRDA process is to "assess
the extent of injury to a natural resource and determine appropriate ways of restoring
and compensating for that injury."' 63 There are different methodologies, but this is generally accomplished by comparing the pre- and post-accident conditions of the affected
environment and then monetizing the difference into a damage amount.164 The body of
law under which a responsible party is sued determines who conducts the assessment and
how. For oil spill accident claims brought under the OPA, the National Oceanic and
65
Thus, NOAA conAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) conducts the NRDA.1
ducted the NRDA for the Deepwater Horizon spill.
Generally, a NRDA conducted under the OPA assesses "damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
assessing the damage."' 66 The definition of natural resources under the OPA is broad,
encompassing the "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water
supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertain67
ing to, or otherwise controlled by the United States."1 While undergoing the assessment, NOAA must provide public notice, provide opportunities for public hearings, and
respond to all meaningful comments on the assessment before implementation of restoration plans.' 68 If the funds collected are in excess of the amount of funds needed for

159
160

161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found., Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund in Louisiana, http://
www.nfwf.org/gulf/Pages/GEBF-Louisiana.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
See, e.g., id.; Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found., Mid-BaratariaSediment Diversion: Engineeringand
Design - Phase II, http://www.nfwf.org/gulf/ Documents/la-mid-barataria-ii-16.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
Nat'l Fish & Wildlife Found., supra note 159.
NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., What is a Natural Resource Damage Assessment?,
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/nrda.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
U.S. ENvTh. PROT. AGENCY, Natural Resource Damages: A Primer, http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/natural-resource-damages-primer (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
See id. (explaining the scientific NRDA process).
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. H§ 2701-2762 (2012); 15 C.F.R. § 990 (2016); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 300.600(b)(1) (explaining the Secretary of Commerce's trusteeship).
33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 2701(20).
Id. § 2706(c)(5).
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ecosystem restoration, the funds must be placed in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.' 69
In general, the OPA allows for damages for the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, or replacing through land acquisition of the damaged natural resources; diminution in value
of natural resources pending restoration; and the cost of assessing the damages.170
Once a NRDA is conducted under the OPA, the assessment is given a rebuttable
presumption of correctness, thus transferring the burden of proof to the responsible party
to disprove the assessment. 7 1 NOAA then has options to conduct its assessment responsibilities, one of which is to sue to obtain compensation from the responsible parties.
Apart from the broad guidelines of the OPA, the specific program for restoration is
guided by NOAA regulations. Under NOAA's final rule, the goal of the NRDA process
is ecosystem restoration, defined as "any action (or alternative), or combination of actions (or alternatives) to restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire the equivalent of injured natural resources and services."1 72 Under this rule, the assessment can be divided
into three phases: (1) pre-assessment; (2) restoration planning; and (3) restoration
implementation.1n
Under the pre-assessment phase, NOAA determines first whether an incident has
occurred.17 Then NOAA must determine if the spill was not excepted under federal,
state, or local law, or was discharged from a public vessel.'17 Finally, NOAA must determine whether an "injury" has occurred to the natural environment.1 7 6 If these three
initial requirements are met, NOAA will then begin to undertake assessment and pursue
either primary restoration (rehabilitating the actual site of the spill) or compensatory
restoration (where NOAA restores other land to balance the ecosystem).177
The second phase, the restoration planning phase, requires a more detailed determination of the injury determination than what occurs in the pre-assessment phase.178 In
this phase, NOAA must establish "pathways" connecting the source of the spill to the
particular damages along the Gulf Coast.1 79 After this determination, the NRDA process
moves on to injury quantification, where NOAA "quantiflies] the degree and spatial and
temporal extent of ... injuries relative to baseline."so The degree of injury is quantified

169 Id. § 2706(f).
170 Id. § 2706(d)(1).
171 Id. § 2706(e)(2).
172 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2016).
173 Id. § 990.12. For a detailed breakdown of the assessment programs NOAA has implemented, see Charles B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Restoration,
72 TUL. L. REV. 417, 466-84 (1998).
174 15 C.F.R. § 990.41(a)(1). "Incident" in this context means "any occurrence or series of
occurrences having the same origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil into or
upon navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the Exclusive Economic Zone." Id.

§ 990.30.
175 Id. § 990.41(a)(2).
176 Id. § 990.41(a)(3). Here, "injury" is defined as "an observable or measurable adverse change
in a natural resource or impairment of a natural resource service." Id. § 990.30.
177 See id. §H 990.41(b), 990.42.
178 See Anderson, supra note 173, at 472.
179 15 C.F.R. § 990.51(d).
180 Id. § 990.52(a).
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taking into account the spatial extent, the "morality percentage," and the temporal extent of the injury.' 8 1
Finally, the restoration implementation phase closes the administrative record on
the planning phase and begins the process of written demands to the responsible parties
to pay for the NRDA assessment.1 82 The responsible parties have ninety days to respond
by either paying the settlement or providing assurance that they will pay the assessed
penalties. 183
For the Deepwater Horizon spill, BP agreed to a NRDA settlement of $8.8 billion
dollars to address natural resource injuries.184 Texas only received $231.651 million of
8
this money since it was the least impacted of the states.1' However, even though this
money has been agreed to in the final consent decree, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the NRDA must still be prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).1 8 6 Therefore, much of the NRDA activity has not yet reached
the court.1 8 7

D. THE

RESOURCES

AND ECOSYSTEMS

OPPORTUNITIES, AND REVIVED

SUSTAINABILITY,

TOURIST

ECONOMIES OF THE GULF COAST

STATES ACT OF 2012-THE RESTORE ACT.
The RESTORE Act is a multifaceted and complex federal grant program that was
enacted by Congress before civil liability for the Deepwater Horizon spill had been adjudicated but in anticipation of the massive penalties that would result.18 It also represents a
departure from the previous model used to administer civil penalties related to oil spill
claims. Typically, civil penalties for oil spill claims adjudicated under the OPA are deposited into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to be used on subsequent spill eventse.g., to pay for an immediate removal of a discharge or to prevent an imminent discharge. 1 89 With the RESTORE Act, Congress dedicated eighty percent of all administra-

See Anderson, supra note 173, at 473.
See 15 C.F.R. § 990.62.
Id.
Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., DEEPWATER HORIZON Oil Spill Final Programmatic
Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan and Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement 1-24 (2016), http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/wp-con5
tent/uploads /Front-Matter-and-Chapter- 1_Introduction-and-Executive-Summary_ 08.pdf
(explaining that BP agreed to pay $8.1 billion for restoration plus up to an additional $700
million to respond to damages unknown on the date of the agreement). This money also
includes a $1 billion dollar sum of "early restoration" that has already been used to work on
ecosystem restoration immediately after the spill. Id.
185 See Government Trustees Restoring the Gulf, RESTORE the Tex. Coast (2014), https://
www.restorethetexascoast.org/govemment-trustees-restoring-the-gulf-nrda/.
186 42 U.S.C. H§ 4321 et seq. (NEPA).
187 See generally In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on
Apr. 20, 2010, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 747 (E.D. La. 2012), rev'd in part, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657
(E.D. La. 2014) (not mentioning NRDA).
188 RESTORE Act, supra note 110, §§ 1601-1608, at 588-607.
189 See 33 U.S.C. § 2712(d)(1) (2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 9509(a)-(c) (2012) (creating and
governing the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund). The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, established in the federal Treasury, is funded primarily by "amounts recovered under [OPA] for
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tive and civil penalties-including OPA penalties and penalties assessed under the
CWA-resulting from the Deepwater Horizon spill to a special fund created under the
RESTORE Act called the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund (RESTORE Fund), leaving the remainder for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.19o
Monies from the RESTORE Fund are intended to fund ecosystem and economic
restoration projects in the Gulf Coast regionl91 and are not subject to legislative appropriation at either the federal or state level.192 That is, a Gulf Coast state does not receive
RESTORE funds as a grant into the state's revenue account for the general operation of
state government. Rather, RESTORE funds must go to ecosystem restoration or economic development projects that benefit the Gulf Coast, and the responsibility for ensuring those purposes are carried out is expressly assigned to specific entities or public
officials in the Gulf Coast states. 19 3 For instance, in Texas, certain duties are assigned to
"the Office of the Governor or an appointee of the Office of the Governor," whereas in
Alabama, that authority is given to a council of state and local public officials.194
Monies from the RESTORE Fund are allocated to the five Gulf Coast states according to a structure outlined in the Act that divides the money into five separate pots or
"buckets," as they are commonly called.'19 Each bucket governs a specified percentage of
RESTORE Fund monies and provides how and for what purpose each portion should be
spent.1 96 No two buckets are alike. In sum, monies in the RESTORE Fund are distributed amongst the five buckets as follows: Bucket 1 (35%), Bucket 2 (30%), Bucket 3
(30%), Bucket 4 (2.5%), and Bucket 5 (2.5%).197
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damages to natural resources." 26 U.S.C. § 9509(a), (b)(2). The OPA also requires certain
amounts to be transferred into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund from monies collected
under other bodies of law governing deepwater ports, offshore exploration, and pipelines.
Id. § 9509(b)(4)-(8). Certain environmental taxes on petroleum are also deposited there.
Id. § 9509(b)(1).
RESTORE Act, supra note 110, § 1602(a)-(b), at 588.
The "Gulf Coast region" is defined as a state's coastal management zone under 16 U.S.C.
§ 1453, or 25 miles from that zone. 33 U.S.C. § 1 3 21(a)(33) (2012).
See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0078 (2016), 2016 Tex. AG LEXIS 22 at 8 (addressing the
proper way to administer the expenditure of federal funds allocated to Texas under the
RESTORE Act).
33 U.S.C. § 1321(t).
Id. § 1321(t)(1)(F)(i), (iv). Pursuant to this provision, Governor Perry appointed Commissioner Toby Baker of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality to administer the
RESTORE program in Texas. See RESTORE the Tex. Coast, Conserve, Restore, Renew:
Framework for Implementing the RESTORE Act on the Texas Gulf Coast 3 (2015), https:/
/www.restorethetexascoast.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Framework.pdf. Governor Greg
Abbott reappointed Commissioner Baker in that capacity in 2015. RESTORE the Tex.
Coast, Planning State Expenditure Plan Grant: Texas Proposal app. A (2016), https://www.
restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/PSEP-TX-approval%201etter%20from%20the%2OChai
r-transmittal%201etter-and%20PSEP.pdf.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)-(3) (providing for the various "buckets"); RESTORE Act, supra
note 112, §§ 1602-1605, at 588-606.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)-(3).
See id.; see also RESTORE Act, supra note 110, §§ 1604-1605, at 603-06.
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Bucket 1, or the "Direct Component," allocates its thirty-five percent share of the
RESTORE Fund to the Gulf Coast states in equal amounts (7% of RESTORE Fund
each) for both economic and ecosystem restoration projects. 198 Eligible activities that
can be funded under Bucket 1 include traditional restoration of ecosystems, fisheries,
habitats, beaches, and wetlands, as well as workforce development, job creation, and
infrastructure projects, among others.19 9 The federal Treasury Department oversees the
Bucket 1 funds and will not award any funds to a state until it determines the state has
complied with the Act's requirements. 200 For their part, states must develop a multiyear
implementation plan for the use of Bucket 1 funds and certify that the restoration
projects the state wishes to fund under the plan are consistent with any applicable state
grant or procurement rules.201 Of all the RESTORE buckets, Bucket 1 offers states the
most discretion in deciding how to use the funds.
Bucket 2, or the "Comprehensive Plan Component," allocates thirty percent of the
RESTORE Fund to the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council (Council), an independent federal agency created under the Act made up of the governors of the five Gulf
Coast states (or an appointee of the governor) and representatives from six federal agencieS. 20 2 The Council is tasked with executing a Comprehensive Plan that will fund
purely ecosystem restoration projects along the Gulf Coast. 2 03 Projects are submitted to
the Council for consideration by the Council members themselves, and then a vote is
taken to decide which projects to fund. 204 Unlike Bucket 1 funds, Bucket 2 funds may
not be used to fund solely economic development projects.
On December 9, 2015, the Council approved the Initial Funded Priorities List of
5
projects that it will fund across the Gulf using Bucket 2 funds.20 The list contains
projects in ten key watersheds and estuaries across the Gulf totaling $156.6 million in
funding. 206 Six of those projects are located in Texas in the Laguna Madre, Matagorda

33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)(A); see also 31 C.F.R. § 34.103(a)(1) (2016) (federal Treasury regulations governing the administration of RESTORE Trust Funds).
199 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)(B)(i).
200 Id. § 1321(t)(1)(H).
201 Id. § 1321(t)(1)(E)(iii) -(iv).
202 Id. § 1321(t)(2)(A), (C). Commissioner Toby Baker of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality was appointed by former Governor Rick Perry to represent Texas on the
RESTORE Council, and Governor Greg Abbott reappointed him to that position in 2015.
See supra note 195. The federal members of the RESTORE Council are the Secretary of the
Interior, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating (Department of Homeland Security). 33
U.S.C. § 1321(t)(2)(C).
203 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(2)(C)(vii)(II)(bb), (E).
204 Id. § 1321(t)(2)(C)(vi)(I).
205 Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council, GCERC Funded Priorities List Factsheets,
RestoreTheGulf.gov, https://restorethegulf.gov/gcerc-funded-priorities-list-factsheets (last
visited Apr. 2, 2017).
206 See id. (contains the full list of watershed and estuary projects); Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council, Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act (RESTORE Act) Initial Funded Priorities
198
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Bay, and Galveston Bay areas, and include land conservation, wetland system restoration, beneficial use, and plugging of abandoned oil and gas wells.207
Bucket 3, the "Spill Impact Component," is very similar to Bucket 1 in that it gives
discretion to the states to decide which projects to fund, it can be used to fund projects
with an economic development purpose, and states must submit a plan of proposed
projects (a State Expenditure Plan) to the federal government for approval.208 However,
Bucket 3 funds are administered by the RESTORE Council instead of Treasury. 209 And
Bucket 3 allocates its thirty percent share of the RESTORE Fund to the Gulf Coast
states not in equal portions but rather pursuant to a formula established by the RESTORE Council that is based on the impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill on each
state. 2 10

The Bucket 3 allocation formula takes into account three factors to determine each
Gulf Coast state's proportionate share of Bucket 3 funds: the miles of oiled shoreline a
state experienced from the spill, the distance between the Deepwater Horizon at the time
of the explosion and a state's nearest point of oiled shoreline, and the average population
of a state's coastal counties. 2 11 The formula was established as a federal rule promulgated
by vote of the RESTORE Council.212 The final allocation of Bucket 3 funds pursuant to
the rule is as follows: Alabama (20.40%), Florida (18.36%), Louisiana (34.59%), Mississippi (19.07%), and Texas (7.58%).213
Buckets 4 and 5 of the RESTORE Act contain the smallest allocations of the RESTORE Fund. Bucket 4 allocates 2.5% of the Fund to establish a federal research program operated by NOAA. 2 14 Bucket 5 allocates the same percentage for the
establishment in each state of Centers of Excellence-research programs operated by
nongovernmental entities and consortia of public and private academic institutions that
focus on science, technology, and monitoring in various disciplines such as coastal sustainability, wildlife and ecosystem restoration, and offshore energy development.z15 Pursuant to this provision, the State of Texas has established two Centers of Excellence, one
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List 2 (2016), https://restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/FPL forDec9VoteErrata_ 04-072016.pdf [hereinafter Initial Funded Priorities List].
Initial Funded Priorities List, supra note 205, at 12-14, 23.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(3)(B)(i)(I) (establishing eligible activities for Bucket 3 funding by
reference to the Bucket 1 eligible activities); id. § 1321(t)(3)(B)(i) (requiring states to submit expenditure plans to the RESTORE Council for Bucket 3 funding).
Id. § 1321(t)(2)(C)(vi)(I)(bb) (providing that the Council must approve state plans for
project funding submitted under Bucket 3).
Id. § 1321(t)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
Id. § 1321(t)(3)(A)(ii).
Id.; see 40 C.F.R. 1800.100-.500 (2016) (the Spill Impact Formula Rule with explanations
of each factor).
40 C.F.R. § 1800.500. The State of Texas did not vote in favor of the rule as promulgated
in large part because it did not consider Harris County a coastal county for purposes of
calculating the state's average coastal county population.
RESTORE Act, supra note 110, § 1604(h), at 605.
Id. § 1605(c)-(d), at 605-06.
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focused on offshore energy development and the other on the long-term economic and
environmental health of the Texas coast.2 1 6

VII. CONCLUSION
Out of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, the Gulf Coast states now have an unprecedented opportunity to address and mitigate the damage from the spill and ensure the
Gulf Coast's economic and environmental vitality for future generations. Over the next
fifteen years, as the various settlement installments are paid, funds resulting from the
spill will support economic and ecosystem restoration projects in key watersheds, bays,
estuaries, and crucial centers of economic and tourist activity all along the Gulf Coast.
This opportunity comes with a responsibility to maximize the benefit of all available
funding to Gulf Coast ecosystems and communities. All three major funding streams are
designed to facilitate that goal, and substantial governmental regulation and oversight is
built into each to ensure the funds are expended for their intended purposes.
The various funding frameworks and processes are certainly not without faults. The
Gulf Coast restoration effort in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident, however, is
still in its infancy, so there will be ample opportunity for change and improvement in the
process. The success of the effort will depend in large part on an engaged public, one that
brings forward quality projects to fund and provides input whenever possible on how the
process can be improved. To that end, all stakeholders must remain informed of available funding opportunities-when they begin, which funding stream applies, and for what
purpose. Also, all stakeholders in the restoration process must be patient, for these programs reside in complex, federally-created bureaucratic structures that are designed to
promote transparency and thoroughness, often times at the cost of efficiency.
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216 See Subsea Systems Institute, Univ. of Hous., http://www.uh.edu/uh-energy/ research/subseainstitute/index.php#aboutsubsea (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (Center of Excellence focusing
on offshore energy development); Tex. OneGulf Ctr. of Excellence, http://www.texasone
gulf.org/ (last visited on Apr. 2, 2017) (Center of Excellence focusing on the long-term
economic and environmental health of the Texas coast).

